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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XIII JUNE, 1928 NUMBER 4
DISTRIBUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER BETWEEN
UNITED STATES AND STATE COURTS
FELIx FRANKFURTER*
To E. H. W.
A Festschrift is a fitting mode for honoring a scholar, for it is not so
much a bestowal upon the celebrant, as an offering by his admirers to
the gods of his intellectual fealty. One trembles to approach E. H.
Woodruff's deities, though the impulse be ever so eager. Gold and
silver I have not-neither golden speech nor silver silence. But-
"we live by symbols." Perchance E. H. W. will transmute meagre-
ness into the scale and significance worthy both of the theme and of
him who inspired it. To E. H. W., law is neither narrow nor con-
strained. It is the governance of society, politics under guidance of
reason. And beneath the dry. and technical phrases of Federal
Judiciary Acts lie those deep issues of statecraft that stir so lustily the
rich stream of Woodruff's talk.
I
One hundred and forty years ago there began a great debate con-
cerning the functions of the national courts under the new Union.
What should be the scope of their authofity? What their relation to
the state courts? Intermittently, that debate has continued through-
out our history, and now, thanks to Senator Norris of Nebraska,
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,1 we are at the beginning
of another important stage of the discussion. Nothing but good can
come from a re-examination of the purposes to be served by the federal
courts. Their historic contributions, above all their share in mould-
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1See Senator Norris' bill, S. 3151, reported out of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on March 27, 1928, with Sen. Rep. No. 626, 7oth Cong. 1st Sess., as
amended by Senator Norris on May 8, 1928 (69 Cong. Rec. 8439 et seg.). For
memorandum in opposition to this bill by the Committee on Jurisprudence and
Law Reform of the American Bar Association, see the Congressional Record
for May 8, 1928 (69 Cong. Rec. 8439 el seg.); for further comments and
criticism on S. 3151, see 69 Cong. Rec. 7559 (April 26, 1928), 7637 (April
27, 1928).
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ing the loosely knit states into a nation, have rooted the United States
courts deeply into our national consciousness. They need not fear
fair scrutiny.
It is proper to inquire into the appropriateness of the existing dis-
tribution of judicial power, just as the substance of law is revised
from time to time in response to new needs. Whatever survives such
an inquiry can only help to strengthen the judicial system. Especially
is this true of the federal judiciary. Like all courts, the federal courts
are instruments for securing justice through law. But unlike most
courts, they also serve a far-reaching political function. They are a
means, and an essential one, for achieving the adjustments upon which
the life of a federated nation rests. The happy relation of states to
nation-our abiding political problem-is in no small measure depend-
ent on the wisdom with which the scope and limits of the federal
courts are deternined.
Thus, in providing for a federal judicial establishment, Congress is
confronted with problems which trouble neither Parliament2 nor state
legislatures. Parliament in dealing with the High Court of Justice
and legislatures in devising state judicial organizations, are con-
cerned only with the effective distribution of their internal judicial
power-the appropriate structure of their local courts, and how they
shall function. These are largely technical questions, calling pre-
dominantly for the judgment of the legal profession. So, also, in the
main it is for lawyers to say how judicial authority should be dis-
tributed within the federal system, and what procedure is most apt
for its business. But in the series of Judiciary Acts, beginning with
Senate Bill No. I, of the very first session of the Senate, Congress has
had to face a very different and more perplexing problem-that of the
relation of the United States courts to the states. Here is a complica-
tion peculiar to a federated nation. Here is a conflict full of political
explosives, because entangled in the complex of relations between
states and nation. These are issues of the very stuff of American
politics, to be settled or evaded by the compromises of one generation,
only to reappear in the next. They are not technical issues, nor with-
in the special province of lawyers. The formulation of the compro-
2In legislating for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, however,
Parliament deals with a tribunal which serves for the British Empire a purpose
similar to that performed by the Supreme Court. See Viscount Haldane, The
Work for the Empire of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (1922) I CAMB.
L. J. 143; 2 KEITH, RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINIONS (2d ed. 1928)
pt. VI c. III; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1928) 307.
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mises demand legal skill, and of a high order. But the bases of adjust-
ment must be evolved by statesmen, and ought both to enlist and
to satisfy public understanding.
In the original Act "to establish the Judicial Courts of the United
States,"3 Congress had to devise the internal structure of the federal
judiciary and also to formulate its relations to the state judiciaries.
Again, in the drastic but short-lived overhauling of the whole system
by the Federalists, Congress dealt with both aspects of federal
judiciary legislation.4 The two problems, of course, interblend. For
example, efforts at relief of congestion in the federal courts can hardly
escape inquiry into the sources of their business, and that inevitably
leads to scrutiny of the allotment of the common fund of litigation
available for distribution between state and United States courts.
But, on the whole, in the voluminous body of laws governing the
United States courts scattered through the forty-six volumes of
the Statutes at Large, Congress seldom deals with both problems
at the same time. It either readjusts jurisdiction within the
federal hierarchy or shifts the balance of authority as between state
and federal courts. From time to time, interest or exigency throws
the emphasis from concern over effective judicial administration by
the United States courts, as an independent system, to reconsidera-
tion of the place of the national courts in the federal scheme. Thus,
the Act of February 4, 1815," the "Force Bill" of 1833,6 the Civil War
Removal Acts,7 the "separable controversy" provision of 1866,8 the
Judiciary Acts of 18751 and 1887-88'0 involved, predominantly,
redistribution of power between United States and state courts. On
the other hand, the Act of March 3, 1837," theAct of March 2, 1855,12
3Act of September 24, 1789, I Stat. 73. See Warren, New Lighlt on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARV. L. REV., 49; Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 483.
4Act of February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 21 et seg.
53 Stat. 195, (1815) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 118.
6Act of March 2, 1833, § 3, 4 Stat. 632.7See e.g. Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 and see FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 61 et seg.
SAct of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 306, (1866) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § l108.
9Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, (1875) U. S. Comp. Stat. (x916) § 991 (I)
et seq.
1
°Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, (1887) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) 991 (I),
et seg. corrected by act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, (1887) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(i916) §§ 2954-58.
115 Stat. 176 (1837). Ilo Stat. 631 (1855).
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the Judiciary Act of 1869,1 the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, i8gi,14
the Judicial Code, 1911,15 the Act of September 14, 1922,16 and the
Judiciary Act of 192 5,17 were preoccupied with the internal adminis-
tration of the federal judiciary.
Since the Civil War, five major revisions have been made in the
internal economy of the United States courts. The new circuit
judgeships of 1869,'8 the establishment in 189i of nine intermediate
appellate tribunals,19 the cessation in 1912 of the historic circuit
courts, 20 the addition, by the single Act of 1922,21 of more judgeships
than were included in the entire system established by the First
Judiciary Act, the creation, by the same Act, of the conference of senior
circuit judges,22 and the recent drastic contraction of obligatory review
by the Supreme Court,u have radically transformed the federal
judiciary as Marshall and Taney and Chase knew it. Judicial
reorganization had to respond to the pressure of forces which have
made the United States a country very different from that which
Jefferson and Jackson and Lincoln governed. No other people in the
world has assumed the task of administering a single system of
courts scattered over so vast an area as the United States. The
series of piece-meal changes-in the structure of the national judiciary
and'in its internal distribution of business, converge towards achieving
a more articulated and workable system.
To mobilize adequately the resources of the judicial establishment,
to simplify as much as possible the inevitable complexities of a system
of courts spanning a continent, to secure a fair balance between the
federal system and state judiciaries, to relieve the Supreme Court
from all obstructions to the performance of its functions,-these have
been the aims of legislation regulating the organization of the federal
courts.
For forty years 4 there has been no organic reconsideration of the
scope of business entrusted to the lower federal courts. Recently a
23Act of April 1o, 1869, I6 Stat. 44. l4Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826.15Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1o87, (I91i) U. S. Comp. Stat. (19x6) § 968,
efseg.
1642 Stat. 837, (1922) U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 1215a.
IlAct of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936.
lSgupra note 13. lgSupra note 14.20Act of March 3, 1911, § 289, 36 Stat. io87, 1167, (1911) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(I916), § 1266. 2nSupra note 16.
2Act of September 14, 1922, § 238a, 42 Stat. 837 (1922) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(Supp. I923) § I25 a . See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, op. cIt. supra note 2, C. VI.
2Sup n note 17.
2Since the Judiciary Acts of 1887-88, supra note io.
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few isolated measures have made some significant contraction of
jurisdiction. There have been also some abortive efforts at major
restriction 6 But in truth, for more than fifty years there has been no
comprehensive revision. For the Act of 1887-8827 largely took for
granted the jurisdictional assumption which underlay the Judiciary
Act of 1875.28
A division of judicial labor among different courts, particularly be-
tween a dual system of federal and state courts, is especially subject
to the shifting needs of time and circumstance. That the wisdom of
1875 is the exact measure of wisdom for today is most unlikely.
Within half a century the interplay of industrial and financial
forces has greatly affected social habit and political sentiment. At
different times and for different purposes the respective r6les of
national and local authority have changed. Modem legal education
is exerting considerable influence upon bench and bar. Surely these
tendencies are not without relevance to the effective organization of
the judicial systems of the United States, and a wise distribution of
their activities. The indispensability of the federal judicial system
to the maintenance of our federal scheme may be taken as a political
postulate. But the details of jurisdiction are, after all, details. As
such, their specific functions ought to submit to the judgment of ap-
propriateness to the needs and sentiments of the time. Especially
should they be saved from an excess of responsibility which may
seriously impair their peculiar federal tasks.
Of these, the profoundest need is that the Supreme Court may be
free to adjudicate great issues of government. "The most important
function of the court," the present Chief Justice has told us, "is the
construction and application of the Constitution of the United
States. ' 29 All other purposes are subsidiary; all other litigation must
be subordinated. To this end, Congress has translated into law the
Court's own views upon the duties and powers appropriate to its
functions.30 The Judiciary Act of 1925, and the energetic labors of
Chief Justice Taft and his Associates have enabled the Court to
2sE.g. Act of April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291 (i91o) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ IOlO,
8662, 8665; Act of January28, 1915, § 5,38 Stat. 804, (1915) U. S. Comp. Stat.
(I916) § 1233a; § 266 of the Judicial Code as amended by the Act of March 4,
1913, 38 Stat. ioi3, 1014.
26See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 89 et seq., 136 et. seq.
27Supra note io. 28Supra note 9.
29Taft, Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure (1916) 5 Ky. L. J. No. 2,3, 18.
See also FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 2, C. VIII
8GAs to the part played by the Supreme Court in recent judiciary legislation, see
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 255 et seg.
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remove arrears and to reach in regular course cases docketed this
Term.
But the present equilibrium of Supreme CQurt litigation will not
long be maintained. The volume of the Supreme Court's business
will again increase as it has in the past increased after every measure
for the relief of congestion. Moreover, it is not enough that the
Supreme Court should keep abreast of its docket. The perplexities
of the issues that come before it and the profound consequences of its
decisions set the Supreme Court apart from other tribunals. Refer-
ring to an earlier period, the Chief Justice has given warning that if the
Supreme Court's business "is to increase with the growth of the
country, the work which it does will, because of haste, not be of the
high quality that it ought to have.. ."31 Even now, despite the great
load lifted by the Act of February 13, 1925, the Court is working under
too much pressure to afford the spacious reflection so indispensable
for wise judgment.
Heretofore, increase in the Court's business has been met with
decrease in its jurisdiction. But in future, relief can hardly come by
narrowing the scope of obligatory review and making resort to the
Court still further dependent upon grace in individual cases. The
Act of 1925 has cut the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to the bone.
The very limited categories of cases which now go to Washington as
of right, imly precisely those issues for the disposition of which
the Supreme Court exists. It is most improbable that they will be
subjected to the discretionary writ of certiorari. Moreover, the
volume of certioraris even under the present arrangement is in itself
likely to present before long a drain of undue pressure on the Court's
time and strength. During the 1925 Term there were 539 petitions
for certiorari; 5o more during the 1926 Term and, accordingto present
figures, this Term will register a further increase.
Modes of relief other than abandonment of obligatory review will
have to be explored. In due course we shall again hear of the peren-
nial plan to increase the membership of the Court and to have it sit
in divisions. Even the American Bar Association sponsored this as late
as 1921, only to encounter the opposition of the Court.12 The folly of
such schemes has been exposed every time they have been seriously
urged. This way out is worse than futile; it is mischievous. A more
serious inroad upon the Court's authority and its deliberative proc-
esses could hardly be devised. Greater parsimony in granting
certioraris will offer itself as another means of curtailing business.
32See (1921) 46 A. B. A. REP. 384, 391.s'Supra note 29.
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This again is not a promising road to relief. The Court is now
administering its discretionary powers with frugality. Out of 539 peti-
tions for certiorari n the 1925 Term, iio were granted; i i9 out of 589 in
the 1926 Term; 97, up to May 14, out of 567 inthe 1927 Term.3
While in individual instances, cases are taken in which issues of
public importance are not apparent, these are cancelled, at least,
numerically, by denials of cekiorari in cases presenting truly serious
questions of public concern.35 No doubt as certioraris multiply, the
Court will be tempted to stiffen still more its rigor, but no hope of
coping with the swelling stream of litigation can be found in damming
more amply than it does at present the flow of certioraris.
Through other means must the Court be saved for its essential
work; in other directions must restrictions be found upon the growth
of its business. Mr. Justice Holmes' main remedy for every variety of
evil "is for us to grow more civilized."3 That prescription has practi-
cal application for the difficulties presented by the growing volume of
Supreme Court litigation. A more select bar, better equipped pro-
fessionally, more cultivated, with a heightened sense of professional
esprit would make for more thorough knowledge of records, shorter
and more pungent arguments, more compact briefs. Such a bar would
imply also, learned and highly skilled judges of inferior courts, who
would subject litigation to a thorough process of consideration before
it reached the Supreme Bench. All this would help immensely the
ability of the Supreme Court to dispatch its business with "high
quality."
Most important of all, however, the stream of Supreme Court
litigation is conditioned by its feeders. Interstate controversies, to
be sure, are apt to raise not only grave issues, but involve a mass of
intricate facts, thereby occasioning considerable inroad upon the
Court's time. But such controversies are infrequent and other
demands upon the Court's original jurisdiction are negligible. What
matters is its appellate jurisdiction. With few exceptions, the cases
uThese are privately computed figures to which one must resort in the absence
of detailed judicial statistics officially published.
uSee e.g. a series of cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act at this
Term of Court: Atlantic Coast LineR. R. v. Southwell, 275 U. S. 64, 48 Sup. Ct. 25
(1927); Gulf Etc. Ry. v. Mosler, 275 U. S. 133,48 Sup. Ct. 48 (1927); Gulf Etc. Ry.
v. Wells, 48 Sup. Ct. 151 (1928).
35Doubtless the Court had weighty reasonsfor denying certiorari in cases like
Lewis v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co., I8 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927); 48 Sup. Ct. 31 (1927); but surely important public issues were
therein presented.
Z1 0LIVER W. HOLMES, SPEECHES (1918) 102.
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that come to the Supreme Court come from other courts. The volume
of Supreme Court cases and the nature of their issues are largely
predetermined by the volume and nature of the business of the feeding
courts.
If diversion from the lower federal courts of controversies which
state courts can settle adequately enough would help save the
Supreme Court for its more essential labors, this would be a gain of
moment. If maintenance of the present ambit of jurisdiction of the
district courts involves inflation of its numbers which, by its own
Gresham's law, results in a depreciation of the judicial currency and
the consequent impairment of the prestige of the federal courts, surely
we ought to restrict litigation in order to preserve their efficacy.
Since the volume and nature of litigation so largely conditions the
character and competence of judicial tribunals, a dispassionate
inquiry into the sources of present day federal litigation ought to be-
particularly welcome to those most attached to the federal courts.
But the proper allocation of authority between United States and
state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the wise distribu-
tion of power between the states and the nation. Back of litigation is
the prolific energy of legislation. Just because modern economic
forces make so strongly for centralization, there are no more challeng-
ing problems of statesmanship than to decide what tasks shall be
assumed by the central government and by what instruments and
methods it shall perform them. That there are limits, and very
serious limits, to the effective exercise of federal authority needs no
laboring today. What conduct shall be regulated by law and what
shall be left to other forces of social control? What regulative
authority shall be exercised by the central government and what left
wholly to the states or to interstate regional adjustment? Shall
national agencies alone vindicate national laws or shall the states
share in their administration or shall the states alone enforce them?
These are puzzles of American politics in the solution of which is
entangled the welfare of the federal courts. They do not yield to
settlement by formula. Nor are they moral issues to be tested by
abiding truths, like the right to worship according to one's conscience
or freely to pursue scientific inquiry. We are here in the domain of
administrative effectiveness and precedural adaptations,-matters
not of principle but of wise expediency.
II
What powers shall be given to what courts can be determined
neither on a priori reasoning, nor by unchanging political considera-
tions. Equally unsafe guides are the prepossessions of the familiar.
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Both tradition and empiricism have their claim, and both may receive
illumination from the perspective of history. So continuous a process
of legislative compromises as that which is expressed in the past enact-
ments defining federal jurisdiction may yield wisdom for the
present, at least in analyzing the nature of the issues and the relevant
bases for judgment in distributing litigation between state and federal
courts today.
In a summary of the business that has heretofore been given to the
federal courts,3 7 a sharp line must be drawn between cases arising under
the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and contro-
versies deriving significance solely from the citizenship of the parties.37
Different considerations 5 led to the deposit of power in the Constitu-
tion over these two broad groups -of litigation; different considera-
tions have evoked its exercise by Congress from time to time, in
varying degrees and under varying circumstances.
A. Cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States
(i) As originally established, the vindication of these essentially
federal claims was confided in the first instance to the state courts,
reserving, however, through the famous twenty-fifth section of the
First Judiciary Act,39 review by the Supreme Court when a state
court had denied a claim of federal right.
(2) By the Act of February 13, 18oi, the Federalists exercised
almost to the full the constitutional grant of judicial power. The
federal courts were entrusted with all litigation "arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties... and also
of all... matters... cognizable by the judicial authority of the
United States, under and by virtue of the Constitution thereof, where
the matter in dispute shall amount to four hundred dollars." 40
37This is not an attempt to explore the full range of "the judicial power of the
United States." The judicial area most actively in dispute between state and
federal courts is my concern. Therefore, I put on one side the "federal special-
ties," admiralty, bankruptcy, the federal criminal law, Indian and land litigation,
patents, etc. Nor need jurisdiction over diplomatic officers and aliens detain us.
For references to the whole body of legislation defining the jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts from 1789 to 1924 see Frankfurter and Landis, Power to
Regulate Contemptts (1924) 37 HARv. L. RaV. IoIo, appendix I.
38See Warren, supra note 3; Friendly, supra note 3.
39Act of September 24, 1789, § 25, I Stat. 73, 85. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821); Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme
Court of the United States (I913) 47 Am. L. REv. I; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, op.
cit. supra note 2, at I89 et seq.
402 Stat. 89, 92.
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(3) As Macaulay's school boy knows, this vast power was with-
drawn almost before it was asserted. On March 8, 1802, the law of
the "midnight judges" was repealed.41 Seventy-five years elapsed
before the federal courts were again made the general depositories of
claims of federal rights. 2
(4) But exigencies from time to time led to specific and temporary
protection of federal claims through the national courts. By way of
illustration:
a. In answer to New England's resistance to the prosecution of
the War of 1812, the Act of February 4, i815, provided for the
removal from the state courts of suits against federal officers
enforcing the collection of war revenues.'
b. Again countering threats of nullification, this time by
South Carolina, the "Force Bill" of 1833 authorized removal of
all suits against officers of the United States on account of any
acts done by them under the revenue laws.
c. The Civil War occasioned a series of similar enactments,
providing for the removal of cases from state courts into federal
courts when the defendant asserted some federal immunity or
was exposed to the hazards of local prejudice against the na-
tional authority."
All this was ad hoc legislation-not abstract or systematic assertion
of federal power, but measures governing restricted types of contro-
versy, and directed towards demonstrated inadequacy of state
agencies.
(5) By theAct of July 27, i868, removal was permitted from the
state courts in all suits against corporations other than banking,
organized under a law of the United States, for any liability of such
corporation where a defence was based on the Constitution, or any
treaty or law of the United States.
46
(6) By the Act of February 28, 1871, removal from state courts
was permitted in suits or prosecutions growing out of prevention,
under federal authority, of racial discrimination in voting. 7 This
was repealed by the Act of February 8, 1894.48
(7) By the Act of March 3, 1875, the circuit courts were given
"original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
states, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitu-
412 Stat. 132. 42Supra note 9.
43§ 8, 3 Stat. x95 (1815) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 118.
4Supra note 6. 45Supra note 7.
4615 Stat. 227, (1868) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § xo18.
4716 Stat. 433, 438. 4s28 Stat. 36, (1894) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1015.
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tion or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or shall be
made under their authority...-49
By this Act, for the first time (barring the abortive Act of 18oi) the
federal courts became the primary and dominant instruments for
vindicating rights given by the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States. Thereafter, litigation asserting such rights could be
initiated in the federal courts, and could be removed thereto when
begun in the state courts. Latitudinarian construction of this Act by
the Supreme Court opened still wider the sluices of Federal litigation.
In the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases0 the Supreme Court held that
every case, irrespective of its nature, brought by or against a federally
charted corporation is a suit arising under the "laws of the United
States." Tort claims against the Pacific railroads and like litigation
crowded federal dockets, and stimulated strong local animosity
against federal courts.-" By successive stages, as we shall note,
Congress cut off this fertile source of business until, in 1925, it was
wholly eliminated.
(8) The effect of the Act of July 12, 1882,52 was to prevent re-
moval of suits by or against a national bank solely on the ground that
it was incorporated under federal law. So far as access to the federal
courts was concerned, national banks were assimilated to local banks
in the states of their enterprise.
(9) The Judiciary Act of 1887,1 as amended by the Act of 1888,
made two further restrictions upon the jurisdiction initiated by the
act of 1875 : the privilege of removal from state to federal courts was
restricted to defendants, 5 and the necessary amount in dispute was
raised from five hundred to two thousand dollars.56 By the Judicial
Code of 191 I,57 the jurisdictional sum was increased to three thousand
dollars.
(io) The Federal Employers Liability Act, in igo8,55 gave con-
current jurisdiction to state and federal courts of cases arising under
it. But Congress very soon checked the heavy flow of federal em-
ployers liability litigation which came to the federal courts, by pro-
hibiting removal of such cases from the state courts.59
49Supra note 9. 50115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113 (I885).
513 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) 407, 408.
52C. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 163, (1882) U. S. Comp. Stat. (I96) § 9668.
Supra note Io. 5Supra note 9. 5'§ 2, infra note 85.
56§ I, U. S. Comp. Stat., supra note 9, § IoIo. 57Supra note i5, § 991 (1).
58Act of April 22, 19o8, c 249, 35 Stat. 65 (i9O8) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8657
el seg.
59Act of April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291 (I9IO) U. S. Comp. Stat. (i926) §§ ioio, 8662,
8665.
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(ii) After the Act of 1875, the lower federal courts were increasingly
asked for injunctions to set aside state legislation and to restrain
'state administrative agencies. Enormous power over state affairs
was thus lodged in single judges. To provide ampler safeguards
against the exercise of this authority, Congress, in i91o, required
three judges to hear prayers for interlocutory injunctions in such
suits.6" This device of numbers was first introduced by Congress in
190361 into the judicial system for proceedings by the United States
arising under the Sherman Law or the Interstate Commerce Act, as a
protection against improvident decrees by a single judge in suits of
considerable political import, usually turning on complicated economic
facts. A striking further limitation was in 1913 put upon the power
of the district courts to restrain the enforcement of state laws and
state boards administering such laws. The states were empowered
to entrust their own courts in the first instance with litigation con-
cerning the validity of state regulation:
"It is further provided that if before the final hearing of such
application a suit shall have been brought in a court of the State
having jurisdiction thereof under the laws of such State, to enforce
such statute or order, accompanied by a stay in such State court
of proceedings under such statute or order pending the deter-
mination of such suit by such State court, all proceedings in any
court of the United States' to restrain the execution of -such
statute or order shall be stayed pending the final determination
of such suit in the courts of the State. Such stay may be vacated
upon proof made after hearing, and notice of ten days served
upon the attorney-general of the State, that the suit in the State
courts is not being prosecuted with diligence and good faith."6 2
(12) By the Act of January 28, 1915,0 Congress took out of the
federal courts the litigation which the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases
had brought there, by providing that
60Act of June 18, 1910, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557, (i9io) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916)
§ 1243 which was embodied in § 266 of the Judicial Code. This provision was
explicitly made applicable to suits to enjoin the orders of a state commission by
the Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 1013, (1913) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8168,
but, as a matter of construction, cannot be availed of in suits to restrain a munici-
pal ordinance. See e.g. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Memphis, 198 Fed. 955
(W. D. Tenn. 1912). And see discussion of this provision in dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in King Mfg. Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 48 Sup.
Ct. 00 (1928).
61Act of February Ii, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, (1903) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916)
§§ 8824-25.
62§ 266 of the Judicial Code, supra note 15, as amended by the Act of March 4,
1913, 37 Stat. 1013, 1014, (1i3) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1243. And see
Pogue, State Determination of State Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 623.
6§ 5, 38 Stat. 8o4, (1915) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1233a.
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"no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any
action or suit by or against any railroad company upon the
ground that said railroad company was incorporated under an
act of Congress."
(13) The Merchants Marine Act, 1 9 2 0 ,6 in somewhat ambiguous
language applies5 to seamen's actions, for personal injuries as well as
for death given by it, the provisions against removal in the Employers
Liability Act.66
(i4) Forty years after the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases the
Supreme Court asked Congress to relieve the federal courts of the
remaining burden of business due to that decision.67 And so Congress,
in the Judiciary Act of 1925, provided that
"no district court shall have jurisdiction of any action or suit by
or against any corporation upon the ground that it was incor-
porated by or under an Act of Congress: provided, That this
section shall not apply to any suit, action, or proceeding brought
by or against a corporation incorporated by or under an Act of
Congress wherein the Government of the United States is the
owner of more than one-half of its capital stock." 6
(i5) Finally, Mr. Warren69 has directed attention to the numerous
instances, during the first fifty years, in which Congress gave to the
state courts concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over
violations of the federal criminal law. To this day enforcement may
be had in the state courts of some penalties and forfeitures arising
under federal statutes.
B. Cases Depending upon the Citizenship of Parties
The legislative outlines of federal jurisdiction over controversies
"between citizens of different States' 7 0 are briefly sketched. Judicial
construction, responsive to the forces of corporate business develop-
ment, utilized a few technical statutes, awkwardly expressed and
often ambiguous, to divert to the federal courts an overwhelming mass
of litigation which raised no federal questions.
6Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. 988, (1920) U. S. COmp. Stat. (1923 Supp.)
§ 1946 et seg.
6See the opinions of Judge Learned Hand in Beer v. Clyde Steamship Line, 300
Fed. 56I (S. D. N. Y. 1923), and Martin v. U. S. Shipping Board, i F. (2d) 603
(S. D. N. Y. 1924).
16Supra notes 58 and 59.
67See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 272, 273.
68Supra note 17, at § 12.
69Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV.
545.
"U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
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(i) The First Judiciary Act allowed suits in the federal courts
between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought and a citizen
of another state, when the dispute exceeded five hundred dollars)"
Such suits, when begun in state courts, could be removed by the
defendant to the federal courts "at the time of entering his appearance
in such state court."7 2
(2) The abortive Judiciary Act of 18oi left the scope of this phase
of jurisdiction unchanged, except that the required ad damnum was
reduced to four hundred dollars. 3 Upon the repeal of this Act the
following year the minimum was again fixed at five hundred dollars' 4
(3) As delineated by Congress, the scope of jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship remained unchanged for eighty years. The
Supreme Court in the early days of Marshall put one important
limitation upon this source of business. In litigation by plural parties,
a suit could not be taken to a federal court if there was identity of
state citizenship between any one plaintiff and any one defendant.7 5
The Separable Controversy Act of i866 qualified this doctrine to the
extent that a defendant in a state litigation, who is a citizen of another
state, may
"if the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of
the controversy, so far as it concerns him without the presence of
the other defendants as parties in the cause.... at any time be-
fore the trial or final hearing of the cause" remove "the cause
against him"
into the federal court, leaving the plaintiff to pursue his remedy
against the other defendants in the state court.76
(4) By the Act of March 2, 1867, Congress enabled a nonresident
litigant in a state court, whether plaintiff or defendant, to remove to
the federal court a case otherwise within Strawbridge v. Curtiss, and
not presenting a separable controversy, upon showing by affidavit
"that he has reason to and does believe that, from prejudice or
local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such State
court.' 
,
(5) The Act of 1875 allowed controversies between citizens of
different states to be brought in the federal court in any district in
which the defendant "is an inhabitant or in which he shall be found
at the time of serving" process, or to be removed thereto by either
party.78 As applied by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Schollen-
71§ I1, I Stat. 73 (1789). -§ 12, I Stat. 73, (1789).
73§§ II and 13. 74Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.76Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 (U. S. I8O6).
"Supra note 8. 7714 Stat. 558 (1867).
78§ 2, 14 Stat. 470, (1875) U. S. Comp Stat. (1916) § ioio.
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berger,7 1 these provisions opened the door of the federal courts to a
corporate litigant in every state in which a corporation transacted
business through an agent.
(6) The First Judiciary Act guarded against misuse of jurisdiction
founded on diversity of citizenship through colorable assignments of
choses in action by forbidding an assignee (other than an holder of
foreign bills of exchange) to sue in the federal courts unless suit
therein could have been brought by his assignor.8" The Act of 1875
allowed holders of "promissory notes negotiable by the law merchant"
to sue in the federal courts regardless of the capacity of his assignor
to maintain a federal suit."' Having thus expanded the ambit of
jurisdiction, the Act of 1875 also provided against its abuse:
"if in any suit commenced... or removed.., from a state court
• .. it shall appear... that such suit does not really and sub-
stantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of such circuit court, or that the parties to such suits
have been improperly or collusively made or joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable or removable under this act, such circuit court shall
proceed no further therein." '
(7) The Judiciary Act of 1887-88 placed four new restrictions on
diverse-citizenship litigation: (a) the threshold amount was made
two thousand dollars; (b) suit could no longer be brought in a district
in which the defendant "shall be found," but only where the defend-
ant was "an inhabitant." A corporation, the Supreme Court held,
was an "inhabitant" within the meaning of this Act only in the state
of its incorporation; (c) the right of removal to a federal court was
withdrawn from the plaintiff who initiated litigation in a state court.
Only a nonresident defendant could remove; (d) suits upon assigned
claims were further restricted by denying jurisdiction after assign-
ment unless it existed before, excepting suits on foreign bills of ex-
change and corporate bearer notes."
While the Act of 1887-88 thus shut doors to the federal courts, it
widened one source of access to them. In introducing removal of
"separable controversies," the Act of i866 allowed a defendant to
remove "the cause as against him."84 According to the 1887-88
legislation, where a separable controversy was contained in a suit, the
affected defendant was authorized to "remove said suit."85 This, the
7996 U. S. 369 (1878). 80§ II, supra note 71. 81§ I, I8 Stat. 470.
81§ 5, 18 Stat. 47o, (1875) U. S. Comp. Stat. (i916) § ioi9.
3§§ 1 and 3, 24 Stat. 552, (1887) U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ 991 (I), 991 (2),
I010, 1OI, 1012, 1033, 1048.
8414 Stat. 3o6-07 (1866). 85§ 2, 24 Stat. 552 (1887).
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Supreme Court held,8 carried the entire litigation to the federal
court, irrespective of the residence of the plaintiffs and other defend-
ants.
(8) In 1911, the Judicial Code again lifted the money level of
diversity jurisdiction, this time to its present requirement of three
thousand dollars.87
This short resum6 of legislation plainly reveals the operation of an
empiric process. The constitutional grant of judicial power has never
implied a duty by Congress to employ it. Policy has always deter-
mined when and how and to what extent judicial power should be
exercised. Story's doctrinaire federalism, that "if it was proper in the
Constitution to provide for" judicial authority, "it is wholly irreconci-
lable with the sound policy or interests of the Government to suffer it
to slumber," ' is refuted by the history of the federal judiciary. The
theory and wisdom which have guided action were penetratingly
expressed very early by Mr. Justice Chase:
"The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal
courts derived their judicial power immediately from the
constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the
judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
congress. If congress has given the power to this Court, we
possess it, not otherwise: and if congress has not given the
power to us, or to any other Court, it still remains at the legisla-
tive disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would,
perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral Courts to every subject, in every form, which the constitu-
tion might warrant." '89
Not inherent reasons, then, but practical justifications explain
the past judiciary acts and must vindicate existing jurisdiction. The
force and dangers of parochial attachments, the effectiveness and
limitations of a centralized judiciary administering law over a conti-
nent, the dependability of state courts, the convenience of suitors,
shifting economic and political sentiments,-such influences, with
varying incidence, have shaped the accommodations of authority
distributed between the national judiciary and the state courts. The
present jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition. Always have the ac-
commodations been temporary. The only enduring. tradition repre-
sented by the voluminous body of congressional enactments governing
86Barneyv. Latham, 103 U. S. oo5 (188o).
87§§ 24 and 28,36 Stat. io9i, (1911) U. S. Comp. Stat. (x916) § 991 (1).
88SToRY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY (1851) 293. See also Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304, 328 (U. S. 1816); White v. Fenner, Fed. Cas. No.
17 547 (C. C. R. I. 1818).
89Turner v. Bank of America, 4 Dall. 8, io (U. S. 1799).
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the federal judiciary is the tradition of questioning and compromise,
of contemporary adequacy and timely fitness.
III
The content of federal jurisdiction has been temporary; the needofa
system of federal courts has not been questioned since x789. Nor has
the federal judiciary, as part of our political system, ever had deeper
acceptance in the public mind than today. It is not essential to a
federal government to have federal courts. No other English speak-
ing union has such a system. 0 Thus, the Australian Commonwealth,
although its organic act was closely modelled upon the American-
Constitution, has not exercised the power vested in its Parliament to
establish "other federal courts"'" than the High Court 92 provided for
by its constitution. We may take it for granted, however, that our
distinctively federal law will in the main be enforced through federal
courts. Federal "specialties" are extending their domain and require
a common system of federal tribunals. National sentiment also
regards federal tribunals as the appropriate guardians of federal
rights. But it is a practical sentiment. There are limits to the effec-
tive enforcement of national law. Wise distribution of judicial power
also depends upon the nature of issues. Some federal rights are
readily adapted to enforcement by state tribunals; others are clearly
meant for the federal courts. Some federal rights involve no lively
local interests; others are heavily enmeshed in conflicts between state
and national authority. Civilized law rests on discrimination. No
less must distinctions be taken in devising modes for the administra-
tion of law.
A powerful judiciary implies a relatively small number of judges.
Honorific motives of distinction have drawn even to the lower
federal bench lawyers of the highest quality and thereby built up a
public confidence comparable to the feelings of Englishmen for their
judges. Signs are not wanting that an enlargement of the federal
judiciary does not make for maintenance of its great traditions. In
1884 there were only 66 federal judges; they had increased to ii5 in
90 Mvr. Charles Morse, K. C. the learned editor of the CANADIAN BAR REVIEW,
has kindly called my attention to two specialized Dominion tribunals in addition
to its Supreme Court which, in 1875, was vested with criminal and civil appellate
jurisdiction over the provincial courts. 38 Vict. c. ii (Can. 1875). (See 6 CAN.
B. REv. 240,241).
OtSee (1goo) 63 and 64 Vict. c. 12, § 71.
0"The High Court of Australia was organized under the Judiciary Act of 1903.
See (19o3) Comm. Acts No. 6.
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19o7; there are about 170 today; the pressure for more is steady. It is
idle to ratio the number of judges to changes in the wealth or popu-
lation of the country. Subtle considerations of psychology and
prestige play havoc with the mechanical notion that increase in
the business of the federal courts can be met by increasing the number
of judges.
Some business must be stopped at its legislative source. Almost
every interest of the country is against federal legislation in the
abstract, but ready to invoke such legislation for its own protection.
Every new federal offence means a new burden upon the federal
courts. Criminal cases involve a particularly heavy drain on the
court's time and, as a rule, they are the least attractive to those most
qualified for the bench. Proposals to add to the federal penal code
should therefore be rigorously scrutinized. Federal power should not
be abused by exerting it for the punishment of essentially local
crimes. Federal courts throughout the country, and particularly in
centers like New York, are occupied in trials, frequently lasting weeks,
for what are prosecutions of essentially local frauds, brought to the
federal courts on the tenuous thread, perchance, of a single use of the
mails. Undoubtedly frauds are thus punished, but at the sacrifice of
interests more peculiarly in the keeping of the federal courts. The
question is not whether conduct should be outlawed, but what tri-
bunal shall .deal with it. Penal laws against drug addicts, interstate
automobile thefts, proposals to deal with "fences," all are attempted
short cuts in the effort to prevent and punish crime. I am mindful of
the difficulties of American criminal justice due to state boundaries.
But the resources of the states for better methods of crime prevention
and detection and of interstate cooperation 3 in the prosecution of
crime have hardly begun to be tapped. These resources should be
explored to the full, instead of charging the federal courts with tasks
which in their real significance are state matters.
But even as to federal offences, pressure upon the federal courts
may be partly relieved by freer utilization of enforcement through
state tribunals. There is historic warrant for allowing the states
to share with the federal government in the administration of its
criminal law.9 Not only will this relieve the federal courts; it will
help to enlist local sentiment in support of national legislation, and
See Frandurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the, Constitution (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 685, 698.
"Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv
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thus save the federal criminal law from being weakened by asserting
the distant authority of a centralized government.
Congress has already greatly relieved the dockets of the federal
courts by vesting in the state courts the prolific litigation arising
under the Federal Employers Liability and the Jones Acts, and pre-
venting removal thereof to the federal courts. This is another type
of practical devolution of the central authority, which eases the move-
ment of the federal machinery. Jurisdiction ought thus to be given
to the state courts, whenever federal rights arise out of transactions
which are domiiantly local and readily lend themselves to state
remedies. The national interest in the uniform interpretation of a
federal law is amply protected by the reviewing power of the Supreme
Court through certiorari.9 5
The states, in turn, could save for their own courts litigation which
now heavily burdens the federal courts. Modern business regulation
and taxation give rise to the most perplexing cases. These contro-
versies turn largely on voluminous facts, deriving significance from
judgment on social and economic policy. Suits to restrain such state
action comprise the most contentious phase of the work of federal
courts. Such cases engender strong feeling and easily become the
stuff of politics.
Inadequacy of legal remedy is the basis of equitable intervention
by the federal courts." They are compelled to entertain jurisdiction
in these suits because the states do not provide adequate legal
remedies through their own courts. The legal procedure of the states
has not sufficiently accommodated itself to the consequences of their
regulatory legislation, so that the validity of new legislation or the
application of old cannot be questioned in the state courts without
encountering serious risks. Irreparable damage as, for instance,
the failure of state laws to provide for the recovery of interest on
taxes unconstitutionally levied,17 the harassment of multiplicity of
suits under a questionable statute,9 8 or the threat of oppressive penal-
ties for disobedience of a challenged order of a state commission 9 all
95See e.g., Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Mosler, 275 U. S. 133, 48 Sup. Ct. 48 (1927).
96Judicial Code, § 267; U. S. C., § 384. See unpublished paper of Lockwood,
Maw and Rosenberry, Federal Injunctions and Uncqnstitutional State Action.
97See e.g., Proctor Gamble Distributing Co. v. Sherman, 2 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924). See also Hopkins v.So. Calif. Tel. Co., 13 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926); 48 Sup. Ct. 180 (1928).
98See e.g., Chicago, G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 Sup. Ct. 55 (1924).
99See e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123,28 Sup. Ct. 441 (1go8); Okla. Operating
Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920).
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present forms of inadequacy of legal remedy in the state courts leading
to heavy litigation in United States courts. The states could readily
prevent interference with their tax collection through suits in the
federal courts, by removing the possibility of the claim that there is
no adequate remedy at law in the state courts, if the tax is paid.
So, also, by appropriate changes in the criminal administration of
the states, the excuse could be obviated for seeking injunctions in the
federal courts on claims of irreparable damages and multiplicity of
suits and oppressive penalties before final adjudication in the state
courts of the validity of contested state action.
Congress has already given the states a lead in this direction, but
they have not followed it. As we have seen, under the proviso to
section 266 of the Judicial Code, 0 federal suits to restrain state laws
or orders can be stayed, if, before final hearing, an appropriate
action is brought in a state court "to enforce such statute or order,
accompanied by a stay in such State court of proceedings under such
statute or order pending the determination of such suit by such State
court." From 1913 through the 1926 Term, io8 cases came to the
Supreme Court from the district courts in suits praying for prelimi-
nary injunctions against the enforcement of state legislation and state
administrative orders.10' If the states had had a state procedure
sufficiently effective to acquire jurisdiction, and state officers alert
enough to exercise it, each of these cases could and should first have
been considered by state courts. The states' failure to put into
operation their power to subject state legislation to the sifting process
of the state courts has needlessly swollen the business of the federal
courts and cast upon the Supreme Court some of its most burden-
some labor.
For many of these controversies, though raising constitutional
claims, rest upon a construction of state law or the proper application
of a state constitution to 9tate law. Moreover, in about one-fifth of
these cases relief was based wholly on state issues, apart from any
claims asserted under the United States Constitution.0 2 Yet in only
two of these cases'03 had the federal courts any light upon these local
matters from prior decisions of the state courts. To give meaning
to isolated and frequently obscure expressions of state policy,
behind which may lie unexpressed assumptions familiar to the state
judges, raises perplexities and invites conflicts which are not lessened
1°°Supra note 62.
note 62, at 628.
101See Pogue, State Determination of State Law, supra
1c2Ifid, at 632. 10Ibid.
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by the pressure of federal litigation. 1°4 The Supreme Court is showing
increasing reluctance to find its way through the quicksands of state
legislation without the guidance of state courts. 1 5 All these diffi-
culties would be avoided if the road to the protection of constitutional
rights lay to the Supreme Court from the state courts. Coming thus,
all state matters would be concluded, and the special local facts upon
which constitutional questions now so frequently turn01 would, in the
first instance, be canvassed by judges presumably most familiar with
them.
Probably no type of litigation gives rise to more conflict between
state authorities and the federal courts than the tendency of lower
federal courts to enjoin state regulation of local utilities. No contro-
versies are charged with more intrinsic complexity. Almost always do
they involve the interpretation of local law and local contracts, not
within the special competence of federal judges.0 7 Moreover, these
suits raise very complicated and lengthy issues, demand for the
elucidation of the legal problems a vast exploration of fact, with the
consequent drain upon the time of the federal judiciary. Congress
has already recognized the sensitiveness of the states against initial
interference by the federal courts by requiring a tribunal of three
judges, 08 instead of a single judge, for the granting of injunctions in
104What the Supreme Court has said as to cases arising under Spanish law is
applicable in considerable measure to the views of outsiders on the legislation of
the individual states: "This Court has stated many times the deference due to the
understanding of the local courts upon matters of purely local concern.... This-is
especially true in dealing with the decisions of a Court inheriting and brought up in
a different system from that which prevails here. When we contemplate such a
system from the outside it seems like a wall of stone, every part even with all the
others, except so far as our own local education may lead us to see subordinations
to which we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it, varying emphasis,
tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained only from
life, may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar
never could have got from the books." Diazv. Gonzales, 261 U.S. 102, lo5-o6, 43
Sup. Ct. 286 (1923), per Holmes, J.
1 05
"Many of the objections made raise questions as to the meaning and effect of
recent statutes of the State which have not yet been construed by its courts; and we
are reluctant to pass upon these questions." Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, 26o
U. S. 519, 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 192 (1923).
' See e.g., Euclid Village v. Ambler Realty CO., 272 U. S. 365, 395, 47 Sup. Ct.
114 (1926); Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164, 170 (1927); Miller v.
Schoene, 48 Sup. Ct. 246 (1928).
10 7Mr. Justice Holmes has aptly called the courts of a state the "authorized
interpreter" of its laws and its constitution. See his dissent in Raymond v.
Chicago Traction CO., 207 U. S. 20, 41, 28 Sup. Ct. 7 (1907).
lOsSupra note 60.
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these cases. The time and energy of three judges, therefore, are
absorbed in these controversies. Deep reasons of regard for state
action in matters primarily within state concern 09 suggest that this
field of jurisdiction be entrusted to the state courts in the first
instance, leaving the protection of constitutional rights to.the ample
reviewing power of the Supreme Court. An important source of
federal litigation would be thereby diverted, purely state issues
would be withdrawn from federal cognizance, and an unhealthy
friction between the state and federal courts avoided.
IV
Thus far we have been considering the r6le state courts may play in
the disposition of federal rights. What of the converse-state litiga-
tion in the federal courts? The availability of federal tribunals for
controversies concerning matters which, in themselves, are outside
the domain of federal power and exclusively within state authority, is
the essence of diverse citizenship jurisdiction. It is founded on assur-
ance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to
potential local bias. Thanks to recent scholarship, we now know a
good deal about the historic basis of this grant of jurisdiction"0 and
of its first exercise in 1789."' Plainly enough, this phase of the
"judicial power of the United States" did not grow out of any serious
defects of the Confederacy nor did it anticipate glaring evils. Even
so strong a nationalist as Marshall gave it only tepid support."2 The
available records disclose no particular grievance against state tri-
bunals for discrimination against litigants from without."' The real
fear was of state legislatures,"4 not of state courts. Such distrust
as there was of local courts derived, not from any fear of their partial-
ity to resident litigants, but of their general inadequacy for the inter-
ests of the business community. "There was a vague feeling," writes
Mr. Friendly, "that the new courts would be strong courts, creditors'
courts, business men's courts."" 5 Not born of a deeply-felt national
"09See the remarks of Senator Wagner of New York in introducing S. 449I, 7oth
Cong. 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REc. 9397 (May 18, 1928).
"'Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
"'Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of z789, supra
note 3.
luSee 2 ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON TEE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1828) 391 cited by
Friendly, supra note 3, at 487.
"'Friendly, supra note 3, at 493 et seg.
u4See Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory (1925) 30 AM. Hisr. RPv.
514. M'Friendly, supra note 3, at 498.
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need, diversity jurisdiction began under formidable opposition which,
with fluctuating intensity, has asserted itself throughout our history.
This jurisdiction, particularly in its modem manifestations through
corporate litigation, has aroused strong division of opinion, both
judicial and professional, and repeated Congressional attempts at
curtailment." 6 With a view to circumventing this use of jurisdiction
by foreign corporations, states have resorted to every variety of legis-
lation, frequently frustrated by the Supreme Court."7 Altogether,
diversity jurisdiction has deeply weakened attachment to the federal
courts over a wide area and has unhappily given rise to measures
calculated to impair their usefulness.
According to Marshall's classic justification for diversity jurisdic-
tion, the Constitution entertained "apprehensions" lest distant
suitors be subjected to local bias in state courts, or, at least, it viewed
with "indulgence" "the possible fears and apprehensions" of such
suitors."n Whatever may have been true in the early days of the
Union, when men felt the strong local patriotism of the politically
nouveaux riches, has not the time come now to reconsider how justifi-
able the apprehensions, how valid the fears? The Civil War, the
Spanish War, and the World War have profoundly altered national
feeling, and the mobility of modem life has greatly weakened state
attachments. Local prejudice has ever so much less to thrive on than
it did when diversity jurisdiction was written into the Constitution.
But it is urged that eastern investments in the west and south are
exposed in state tribunals to the risks of unfairness toward non-
resident capital. This is an old claim, and has the momentum of
constant repetition. But, surely, the argument is theoretical. Bank-
ers, and still less investors, do not contemplate litigation for default
when they make loans. What rate they get depends mainly on the
money market and the credit of borrowers. Moreover, diversity
jurisdiction is sought to be retained as eagerly for the federal courts in
U8See e.g., FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 89 et seg., 136
etseg.
117See e.g., HENDERSON, POSITION or FOREIGN CORPORATION IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) c. VIII; Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529,
42 Sup. Ct. x88 (1922).
118'However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is
not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this
subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states." Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 5 Crunch. 6I, 87 (U. S. 1809).
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New York as for those in the west and in the south. The traditional
argument leaves wholly out of account our economic transformation.
Wide diffusion of securities throughout the country, customer owner-
ship of utility stock, employee holdings in large corporations, are
new phenomena of significant dimensions. Indeed, to Professor
Carver they spell an economic revolution in the United States."9
Statistics on these matters are lacking, but there can be no question
of increase in the financing of western and southern development by
local capital. Some utilities themselves dispose of their securities;
bond houses now distribute large issues in these sections; a number of
important eastern investment bankers have western and southern
branches; local stock exchanges have been established, dealing
mainly with local securities. These are changes which affect men's
minds. They transform the sentiment of the community. They
determine the attitude of jurors. Such considerations no longer
allow the easy assumption that in the west and in the south state
juror§ and judges are economic Ishmaelites.
Madison believed that Congress would return to the state courts
judicial power entrusted to the federal courts "when they find the
tribunals of the states established on a good footing."'20 A nation
wide effort is afoot to raise the standards of the bar, to modernize
procedure, to organize the judiciary. University law schools, bar
associations, judicial councils, the American Law Institute, are aiming
at a substantial improvement of the administration of law. Can the
state tribunals not yet be trusted to mete out justice to non-resident
litigants? In any event, is it wise to withdraw from the impulses to
reform of state tribunals influential litigants who, in diversity litiga-
tion, now avoid state courts? Such litigants and their counsel ought
to have every incentive to make state tribunals worthy, and their
administration fair and impartial. Moreover, it is politically highly
unwise to permit the federal courts to be used as an escape from state
tribunals and thus to associate the federal court in the public mind as
the resort of powerful litigants. Congress has shown its confidence
in state courts in actions in which juries are assumed to be specially
biased against corporate defendants, by prohibiting removal to the
federal courts in Federal Employers Liability cases.'2 ' A practice of
eighteen years has vindicated this dispensation. Is there not ample
basis for re-examining the present deposit of jurisdiction in the federal
119CARVER, TEE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES (1926)
passim.
'
2OQuoted by Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
z789, supra note 3, at 66. 1'Supra note 59.
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courts in cases where there is not even the warrant of enforcing a
federal right?
Certainly the obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction should be
promptly removed by legislation-on plain grounds of policy, and to
relieve the over-burdened federal dockets. In the absence of an
adequate system of federal judicial statistics, we are without an
exact basis for analyzing the scope and nature of federal court
business. That the diversity cases represent one of its heaviest
items is common knowledge. According to the usual estimate, they
constitute one-third of the business of the district courts. An exami-
nation of ten recent volumes of the Federal Reporter22 shows that out
of 3618 full opinions, 959, or 27 per cent, were written in cases arising
solely out of diversity of citizenship. In 716 of these cases, or So per-
cent, a corporation was a party.1" Corporate litigation then, is the
key to diversity problems. For legal metaphysics about corporate
"citizenship" has produced a brood of incoherent legal fictions con-
cerning the status of a corporation, defeated the domestic policies of
states, and heavily encumbered the federal courts with controversies
which, in any fair distribution of political power between the central
government and the states, do not belong to the national courts.
The late Gerard C. Henderson"' gave a classic account of the twists
and turns by which it was finally established that a corporation (leav-
ing out the necessary qualifications), for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion, could enter the federal courts in every state outside the state of
its incorporation, 1" but could not be brought into a federal court
anywhere, except by a non-resident in the state of its incorporationY.6
The opportunities for confusion and mischief were elaborated by the
device of multiple incorporation, with its variations of incorporation
by "adoption" by one state of the corporation of another, 2 7 and of
simultaneous incorporation in several states.128 Happily, the law
seldom presents so discordant a medley of decisions and opinions
as those which determine the "citizenship" of a corporation as the
basis of suit in the federal courts. All these difficulties arose through
the innocent presumption of simple days that all the stockholders of a
1M213-22 F. (2d) (1926-1927).
mI am indebted for these figures to the investigation of two of my students,
Messrs. N. Jacobs and A. H. Feller, embodied in an unpublished paper entitled,
Proposed Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.124Supra note 117. mEx parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 (1877).
126Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., '45 U. S. 444, 12 Sup. Ct. 935 (1891).
'2See St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. James, 161 U. S. 545, 16 Sup. Co. 621
(1896).
12Patch v. Wabash Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 277, 28 Sup. Ct. 80 (1907).
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corporation are citizens of the chartering state.129 The Australian
High Court, confronted with similar difficulties, avoided our pitfalls.
Called upon to construe the provision of its Constitution, giving the
High Court jurisdiction in cases "between residents of different
States"'30 of Australia, it held the clause applicable only to natural
persons and not to corporations.' The phrasing of the two Consti-
tutions varies. But the real difference between our doctrines
and the Australian decision is a difference of ioo years. The un-
derlying assumption in Australia is that an Australian corporation, no
matter where registered, can obtain justice in every state court 3 2
At best, diverse-citizenship jurisdiction has elements of unfairness.
A resident of a state when suing another resident of the same state is
compelled to sue in the state court; a non-resident suing the same
defendant has a choice of two courts. The situation is aggravated by
the freedom of the federal courts to make local law in accordance with
their notions of "general jurisprudence," in complete disregard of the
declared law of the state.13 3 The unfairness is increased in the various
situations in which federal courts are not even bound to follow state
court decisions on a state statute or a state constitution. 3 ' When
these doctrines are applied in suits between citizens of a state and a
corporation which does all or part of its business in that state, the
unfairness to residents who are thus made litigants in the feddral
court; as well as to resident parties in similar actions, is unmitigated.
19Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch. 61 (U. S. 18o9). This presump-
tion, it is familiar knowledge, became hardened into a fixed rule of law in Louis-
ville Rail-road Company v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844). The consequences
of this decisionhavebeenpungently stated by Mr. Charles Warren: "This malig-
nant decision has resulted in allowing a corporation sued in the State in which it
actually does business, to remove the suit into a Federal Court on the ground of
diverse citizenship, simply because it happens to be chartered in another State.
No single factor has given rise to more friction and jealousy between State and Fed-
eral Courts, or to more State legislation conflicting with and repugnant to Federal
jurisdiction than has the doctrine of citizenship for corporations. And this diverse
citizenship jurisdiction created by the Constitution and intended to allay friction
and to afford equal and identical law to citizen and non-citizen in a State, has
resulted in putting foreign corporations in a more favorable situation than
domestic corporations, sued in a State." Warren, supra note 3, at 90.
130§ 75 of the Australian Constitution (I9OO) (63 and 64 Vict. c. 12).
131Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Ass. Soc., Ltd. v. Howe,
3x C. L. R. 290 (A.ustr. 1922). luSee Higgins, J., ibid at 330.
nSwift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i {U. S. 1842) and its developments.
134See Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864); Burgess v. Seligman, 107
U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 3o (1882); Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30
Sup. Ct. i4o (39io) and the variations and refinements upon their holdings. For
a discussion of some of these problems see note in (1926) 40 HARv. L. REv. 31o.
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Public as well as private interests are sacrificed. The system leads to
evasion of state legislation embodying legitimate state policies.
Thus, foreign corporations which do business in a state without
complying with constitutional conditions imposed by the state, bar
themselves from enforcing rights in the state courts, but they may
sue in the federal courts of that state.13 5
The temptations for abuse of the doctrine of "indisputable citizen-
ship" 13 were too obvious; needless to say, they have been richly
exploited. A very large part of the business of corporations is done in
states other than that of their incorporation. To a considerable
extent, corporations do all of their business in such other states.
They enjoy the privileges and advantages of the laws of these states
and the benefits of business relations with their citizens. Yet, with-
out the corporate consent, a non-chartering state has not the power to
adjudicate through its own courts disputes.between these corporations
and its own citizens, although such disputes arise wholly from the
activities of the corporation within the state and in no wise impinge
upon matters of federal concern. This jurisdiction has been con-
sciously abused. Men incorporate in a foreign state solely to
avoid subjection to the laws of the state in which they carry on
business and to obtain the advantages of federal jurisdiction.3 7
The operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the same
state is plainly hostile to the reign of law. Janus was not a god of
justice. Litigation in the federal courts is apt to be more expensive
and otherwise more burdensome than in the state courts. The justi-
fication, if any, for these evils and burdens in suits between citizens of
different states, disappears when the suit is between a citizen of a
state and a corporation which does business within that state.
The various types of diversity litigation call for concrete scrutiny in
the light of present-day conditions and the demands upon federal
courts by peculiarly federal litigation. The right to remove to the
federal court a litigation between two non-residents in a state court 8
'
35David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America, 225 U. S. 489, 32
Sup. Ct. 711 (1911).
136St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. James, supra note 127, at 563.
' 
3 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 404
(1928).
1388ee Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railing Co., 260 U. S. 653, 43 Sup. Ct. 230
(1923). As to removals generally, the jurisdiction of the federal courts ought not
to be open to the reproach which the late Judge Rose justly expressed: "Whether
a case is or is not removable, often depends upon incidental or accidental circum-
stances having little discoverable bearing upon anything of real moment." RosE,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION (3 ed. 1926) § 378, P. 352.
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will not survive analysis. "Separable controversy" is also an anoma-
lous source of federal litigation. By bringing the whole controversy
.to the federal courts,3 9 it imposes burdens outside of any federal
justification. It is unfair to other defendants as well as to plain-
tiffs who are content to litigate in the state courts. Moreover, the
apprehension of bias against non-residents, as a basis for diversity
jurisdiction, is here wholly unfounded, since the presence of resident
co-defendants serves as an antidote. A much more troublesome
problem is presented by receiverships based on diverse-citizenship
jurisdiction. 140 Recent extension of federal receiverships is an
obvious source of concern to the federal bench. The administration
of large enterprises, sometimes for years, makes enormous inroads
upon the time of federal judges, embroils them in political contro-
versies, and involves a distasteful exercise of patronage. The Supreme
Court has called a rigorous halt to the abuse of "friendly receiver-
ships,' 4' which were greatly stimulated by Re Metropolitan Railway
Receivership.'" A sharper exercise of discretionary power on the part
of the judges may in practice further limit federal receiverships. But
the essential ground of jurisdiction remains, and must be removed by
legislation. Certainly, local utilities ought to be left to local adminis-
tration in case of difficulties. And it is hard to justify any retention of
federal receivership except as to interstate enterprises.
Whatever is to remain of diversity jurisdiction,'" the law to be
administered by the federal courts is the law of the states. Whenever
that law is authoritatively declared by the state, either by legislation
or by adjudication, state law ought to govern in state litigation,
whether the forum of application is a state or a federal court. Swift v.
Tyson,'" with all its offspring, is mischievous in its consequences,
baffling in its application, untenable in theory, and, as Mr. Charles
Warren recently proved,'" a perversion of the purposes of the framers
of the First Judiciary Act. It results in two independent law-
makers within the same state emitting conflicting rules concerning the
139City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crfummer Investment Co., decided May I4,
1928. (No. 433 October Term 1927).
140See Report of Special Committee on Equity Receivership, Bar Assoc. City of
N. Y. YearBook 1927, at299.
14IHarkin v. Brundage, 48 Sup. Ct. 268 (1928). And see Pussey & Jones Co. v.
Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1923); Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz, 262
U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 480 (1923). - 12o8 U. S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219 (I9O8).
1431n any event, the jurisdictional amount ought to be raised to about $Io,ooo.
This is not to make the federal court a rich man's court, but to save poorer liti-
gants the expense of being taken to the federal courts.
'16 Pet. i (U. S. 1842). IOWarren, supra note 3. at 84 et seg.
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same transactions. The fortuitous circumstance of residence of
one of the parties at the time of suit determines what rule is to pre-
vail in a particular litigation. Such residence is frequently a
designed circumstance. First applied in matters of "commercial
law" and then extended to questions falling within the catch-all
phrase "general jurisprudence," almost all questions may be within its
scope. Its extreme limit has just been reached. An important
public policy of Kentucky concerning use of land in Kentucky, which
had been settled for more than thirty-five years, was allowed to be
defeated by a family that had owned a Kentucky corporation but
procured its dissolution in Kentucky and re-incorporation in Ten-
nessee solely for the purpose of evading Kentucky law and Kentucky
policy by creating the basis of diversity jurisdiction, with the conse-
quent freedom of the federal court sitting in Kentucky to disregard
the long-established course of Kentucky decisions."'
The doctrine has always met with judicial dissent. "Uncertainty
and vascillation"'147 have characterized the theory upon which it has
proceeded. And now, eighty-six years after its enunciation, it is
rejected on the weightiest grounds of theory, as well as of judicial
usurpation, by three Justices of the Supreme Court. In view of Mr.
Justice Holmes' opinion, the doctrine can no longer repose on
tradition:
".... in my opinion the prevailing doctrine has been accepted
upon a subtle fallacy that never has been analyzed. If I am
right the fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption
of powers by the Courts of the United States which no lapse of
time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct. Therefore I think it proper to state what I think the fal-
lacy is.-The often repeated proposition of this and the lower
Courts is that the parties are entitled to an independent judgment
on matters of general law. By that phrase is meant matters
that are not governed by any law of the United States or by any
statute of the State-matters that in States otherthan Louisiana
are governed in most respects by what is called the common law.
It is through this phrase that what I think the fallacy comes in.
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as
a unit ... It is very hard to resist the impression that there is
one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task
of any Court concerned. If there were such a transcendental
body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within
it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United
States might be right in using their independent judgment as to
what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and
11 6Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., supra note 137.
147uhn v. Fairmount Coal CO., 215 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. Ct. 140 (1911).
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illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this
outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with different
meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The
common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called
common law or not, is not the common law generally but the
law of that State existing by the authority of that Statewithout
regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else.
It may be adopted by statute in place of another system previ-
ously in force. Boquillas Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U. S. 339, 345.
But a general adoption of it does not prevent the State Courts
form refusing to follow the English decisions upon a matter
where the local conditions are different. Wear v. Kansas, 245
* U. S. 154, i56, 157. It may be changed by statute, Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, r49 U. S. 368, 378, as is done every day.
It may be departed from deliberately by judicial decisions, as
with regard to water rights, in States where the common law
generally prevails. Louisiana is a living proof that it need not
be adopted at all. (I do not know whether under the prevailing
doctrine we should regard ourselves as authorities upon the
general law of Louisiana superior to those trained in the system.)
Whether and how far and in what sense a rule shall be adopted
whether called common law or Kentucky law is for the State
alone to decide... The Supreme Court of a State does something
more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and
independent of it. It says with an authority that no one denies
except when a citizen of another State is able to invoke an excep-
tional jurisdiction that thus the law is and shall be. Whether it
be said to make or to declare the law, it deals with the law of the
State with equal authority however its function may be de-
scribed."148
The doctrine, it is urged, makes for uniformity of law. So far as
uniformity is needed or desirable, it should be a conscious and syste-
matic process and not depend upon discrete and accidental cases
happening into the federal courts. The governing rules ought to be
formulated by the law-making agency most continuously concerned
with particular problems of law. On the whole, the instances which
come for judgment to the federal courts under Swift v. Tyson are far
less numerous than those which are ruled by state decisions. But
Swift v. Tyson does not make for uniformity. Forty years ago, Judge
Hglt enumerated about twenty-five divergences in doctrine between
the federal and the state courts. 149 These differences have not les-
sened. Evidence is wanting that the state courts yield their own
lsSupra note 137, at 409.
149HoLT, CONCURRENT JURISIDCTION OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS (1888)
162 et seg.
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law. 150 Deeper probably than any rationalization of Swift v. Tyson, is
the temptation of judges to make law according to their own views
when untrammeled by authority. Such intellectual energy must
certainly have moved Story;15' without doubt it influences judges to-
day. But whether the roots of the doctrine be in rational theory or
15Swift v. Tyson was not followed in New York. Per contra, it was expressly
disapproved. Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N. Y. 1843); see also McBride v.
Farmers' Bank of Salem, 26 N. Y. 450, 454 (1863); Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138,
145 (1873). In the following cases, state courts presented with a choice between
the federal doctrine and that of the courts of New York as to the effect of antece-
dent consideration, expressly refused to follow Swift v. Tyson and adopted the
New York rule for their own law: Arkansas: Bertrand v. Backman, 13 Ark. 15o
(1852); Connecticut: Webster & Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atl. 482
(1887); Maine: Bramhall v. Becket, 31 Me. 205 (185o); Minnesota: Becker v.
Sandsuky City Bank, i Minn. 311 (1854); Missouri: Goodman v. Simonds, i
Mo. lo6 (1853); Ohio: Roxborough v. Messick et al., 6 Ohio St. 448 (1856);
Wisconsin: Cook et al. v. Helms & Vandercook, 5 Wis. 107 (1856).
In Oates v. First National Bank, 100 U. S. 239 (1879), which came up from the
federal court in Alabama, the Supreme Court refused to follow Fenouille v. Hamil-
ton, 35 Ala. 319 (1859) on a question of commercial law. The Alabama courts
continued to follow their own decisions. See Thompson v. Maddux, 117 Ala. 468,
477, 23 So. I7 (1897); First National Bank of Decatur v. Johnson, 97 Ala. 655,
661, II So. 69o (1893); Marks v. First National Bank, 79 Ala. 550, 558 (1885);
Miller & Co. v. Boykin, 7o Ala. 469 (1881).
In Lockwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 357 (U. 5. 1873), a case coming from the
federal court in New York, the Supreme Court refused to follow the New York
decisions relative to contracts by common carriers against liability for negligence.
The New York Courts subsequently persisted in their holdings. See Johnston v.
Fargo, 184 N. Y. 379, 77 N. E. 388 (19o6); Brewer v. N. Y., L. E., & W. R., 124
N. Y. 59, 62, 26 N. E. 324 (1891); Maynard v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R., 71 N.Y.
180, 185 (1877).
Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1841), coming from the federal court of
Mississippi was not followed by the Mississippi courts. See Brien v. Williamson,
7 How. 14 (U. S. 1843). Gelpcke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175 (U. S. 1864), applying
Iowa law, was repudiated by the Iowa courts. See McClure v. Owen, 26 Ia. 243
(s868); Ex parts Holman, 28 Ia. 88 (1869). Compare also United Zinc & Chemi-
cal Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup. Ct. 299 (1922) with Serviss v. Cloud, 121
Kan. 251 , 246 Pac. 509 (1926).
See also Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115 (La. 1843); Forepaugh v. Railroad Co., 128
Pa. 217, 18 At1. 503 (1889) which, in applying the law of another state, followed
the decisions of the state courts and expressly refused to follow the contrary
decisions of the federal courts as to the law of that state. See, too, Limerick
National Bank v. Howard, 71 N. H. 13, 19, 51 Atl. 641 (1901).
"The share played by the personality of the author of the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson is thus analyzed by John Chipman Gray: "Among the causes which led to
the decision in Swift v. Tyson, the chief seems to have been the character and
position of Judge Story. He was then by far the oldest judge in commission on
the bench; he was a man of great learning, and of reputation for learning greater
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obscure impulse, it is now too strongly imbedded in our law for judicial
self-correction. Legislation should remove this doctrine, which,
though derived from diverse-citizenship jurisdiction, denies its basis.152
For non-resident litigants were given a federal tribunal to secure a fair
administration of state law, not the administration of independent
law.
Whatever our preferences, the complexities and interdependence
of modem society are bound to throw upon the federal courts in-
creasing burdens of litigation affecting federal rights. The scope of
federal authority has steadily extended during the last twenty years.
Circumstances have been more compelling than differences in the
temperaments of our Presidents and in the prevailing political views
of Congress. Whether national responsibility or state rights were
the accent in speech, the administrations of Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson,
Harding and Coolidge alike have contributed heavily to the growth of
federal authority. This has had its reflex in federal litigation. The
process will not stop. Future controversies in the federal courts,
perhaps even yet more than in the past, will demand wide discern-
ment, capacious mastery of facts, shrewd insight into the ways of
government. Men who inspire the widest confidence, cultivated and
highly trained lawyers, with a touch of statesmanship, should be
drawn into the service of the federal bench. That they may dis-
charge their great functions, the federal courts should be given only
such powers as are appropriate to a national judiciary under a
federal system, so limited as to be capable of disposition by a relatively
small number of distinguished judges.
even than the learning itself; he was occupied at the time in writing a book on bills
of exchange, which would, of itself, lead him to dogmatize on the subject; he had
had great success in extending the jurisdiction of the Admiralty; he was fond of
glittering generalities; and he was possessed by a restless vanity. All these things
conspired to produce the result." GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES or THE LAW
(2d ed. 192X) 253.
152See bill introduced on May 3, 1928, by Senator Walsh of Montana, S. 4333,
7oth Cong. ist Sess. (69 Cong. Rec. 7989).
